Negotiation and Mediation in Conflicts I.: The Role of Mathematical Approaches and Methods by Wierzbicki, A.P.
Negotiation and Mediation in 
Conflicts I.: The Role of 






Wierzbicki, A.P. (1983) Negotiation and Mediation in Conflicts I.: The Role of Mathematical Approaches and Methods. 
IIASA Working Paper. WP-83-106 Copyright © 1983 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/2206/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
NOT FOR QUOTATION 
WITHOUT PERMISSION 
OF THE AUTHOR 
NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION IN CONFLICTS 





Working Papers are interim reports on work of the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
and have received only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily repre- 
sent those of the Institute or of its National Member 
Organizations. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION I N  CONFLICTS 
I: THE ROLE OF MATHEMATICAL APPROACHES IWD METHODS 
Andrzej P. Wierzbicki  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Applied Systems Analys is ,  
Laxenburg, Aus t r i a  
Abs t rac t .  There a r e  many p o s s i b l e  approaches t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of 
c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n s  and ways of developing media t ion o r  n e g o t i a t i o n  
procedures.  I n  gene ra l ,  we can d i s t i n g u i e h  between so&o-political 
approaches,  procedures f o r  mediation and n e g o t i a t i o n  which have 
developed h i s t o r i c a l l y  through p o l i t i c a l  expe r i ence ,  and systems- 
analytical, mathematical  approaches,  which r e l y  on va r ious  branches 
of d e c i s i o n  and game theory  o r  on computerized s i m u l a t i o n  o r  gaming 
models. While the  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  approaches must remain t h e  b a s i s  
of any a n a l y s i s  of c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t hey  can u s e f u l l y  be sup- 
plemented by more-formalized approaches;  bo th  approaches,  when used 
s e p a r a t e l y ,  have t h e i r  l i m i t a t i o n s .  
Th i s  paper ,  a f t e r  a s h o r t  review of e x i s t i n g  sys t ems-ana ly t i ca l  and 
mathematical  approaches,  proposes new concepts  and methods f o r  t h e  
mathematical  a n a l y s i s  of c o n f l i c t  processes .  The proposed approach 
a t t empts  t o  b r idge  t h e  gap between s i m u l a t i o n  gaming models and ex- 
per iments  and more fo rma l  game-theore t ica l  a n a l y s i s  by t ak ing  c e r t a i n  
i d e a s  from i n t e r a c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  suppor ted  gaming, assuming t h a t  t h e  
p l a y e r s  have m u l t i p l e  o b j e c t i v e s  t h a t  they wish t o  s a t i s f i c e  (no t  
op t imize ) ,  and in t roduc ing  s p e c i a l  media t ion procedures a s  a n  element 
of d e c i s i o n  suppor t  du r ing  t h e  game. The mathematical  concepts  used 
a r e  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of s a t i s f i c i n g  game e q u i l i b r i a ,  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of 
c o n s t r u c t i v e  and d e s t r u c t i v e  behavior  (on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  p l a y e r s ) ,  
and a f o r m a l i z a t i o n  of c o n f l i c t  e s c a l a t i o n  and de-escala t ion p rocesses .  
Keywords. Game theory;  gaming; c o n f l i c t  a n a l y s i s ;  n e g o t i a t i o n  theory;  
media t ion;  i n t e r a c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  s u p p o r t ;  s a t i s f i c i n g .  
INTRODUCTION 
The s tudy  of c o n f l i c t s  and t h e  p o s s i b l e  
r o l e  of n e g o t i a t i o n  and media t ion has  a 
long t r a d i t i o n  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and s o c i a l  
s c i ences  ( s e e ,  e.g . , Machiavel l i ,  1515). 
The need f o r  a b e t t e r  unders tanding of t h e  
p rocesses  involved has  become even more 
urgent  s i n c e  t h e  development of n u c l e a r  
weapons. As  a r e s u l t ,  t h e  s tudy of nego- 
t i a t i o n s  has  r e c e n t l y  become t h e  s u b j e c t  
of ve ry  i n t e n s i v e  r e sea rch  v i a  a number of 
d i s c i p l i n e s .  For example, a p r o j e c t  a t  
Harvard Unive r s i ty  b r ings  toge the r  lawyers,  
p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  economists,  mathe- 
m a t i c a l  game t h e o r i s t s  and d e c i s i o n  the- 
o r i s t s  a s  w e l l  a s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of o t h e r  
d i s c i p l i n e s  ( see ,  e .g . ,  F i s h e r  and Ury, 
1981; R a i f f a ,  1982). We can d i v i d e  these  
d i s c i p l i n a r y  approaches i n t o  two broad 
c a t e g o r i e s  : s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  approaches and 
systems-ana l y t i c a t ,  m a t h e m t i c a  l approaches.  
T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  t he  s tudy of n e g o t i a t i o n  
and media t ion dur ing c o n f l i c t s  has  been 
t h e  domain of p o l i t i c a l  and h i s t o r i c a l  
s c i e n t i s t s ,  d ip lomats ,  p sycho log i s t s  and 
s o c i o l o g i s t s .  These s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  ap- 
proaches w i l l  probably remain t h e  b a s i s  of 
a l l  f u t u r e  ana lyses  of c o n f l i c t ,  nego- 
t i a t i o n  and media t ion;  wi thou t  a deep 
understanding of t h e  under ly ing  socio-  
p o l i t i c a l  processes ,  no formal ized char-  
a c t e r i z a t i o n  of any d e c i s i o n  p rocess  can 
eve r  be r e l e v a n t  (see ,  e.g. ,  Wie rzb ick i ,  
1983). This does no t  mean, however, t h a t  
sys tems-analyt ica l  o r  even mathemat ica l  
f o r m a l i z a t i o n  cannot i n c r e a s e  our  under- 
s t and ing  of c o n f l i c t  p rocesses .  As i n  
many o t h e r  a r e a s  of s c i e n t i f i c  endeavor,  
mathematical  f o r m a l i z a t i o n  can he lp ,  f i r s t ,  
i n  checking t h e  cons i s t ency  of b a s i c  con- 
c e p t s  and images. When t h e  under ly ing con- 
cep t s  a r e  c l e a r ,  r e l e v a n t  andfocused  on es- 
s e n t i a l s ,  mathematical  f o r m a l i z a t i o n  can  
a l s o  help  us  t o  d e a l  wi th  complexity by 
producing frameworks f o r  p o s s i b l e  mathe- 
m a t i c a l  models. F i n a l l y ,  g iven  these  
concepts and frameworks, computerized 
models can be b u i l t  and used f o r  va r ious  
purposes : f o r  overcoming complexity,  f o r  
educat ing and a s s i s t i n g  d e c i s i o n  makers i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  a s p e c t s  of a problem, a s  a t o o l  
f o r  s t imula t ing  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  
p a r t i e s  involved i n  a d i s p u t e ,  and s o  on 
( see ,  e .g . ,  Sebenius,  1981). 
The sys tems-analyt ica l  and mathematical  
approaches have produced a l a r g e  v a r i e t y  
of concepts and t o o l s  which could be  use- 
f u l  i n  s tudying c o n f l i c t ,  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and 
mediation.  One of t h e  e a r l i e s t  mathe- 
m a t i c a l  d e s c r i p t i o n s  of armed c o n f l i c t  (a 
" b a t t l e  model") was produced by Lanchester 
(1 916) ; such b a t t l e  models, developed fu r -  
t h e r  by Richardson (1960), Rappaport 
(1957), and r e c e n t l y  by Avenhaus and 
F i c h t n e r  (1983), can a l s o  suggest  i n i t i a l  
cond i t ions  t h a t  would reduce t h e  l ike l ihood  
of war and could thus  be h e l p f u l  i n  nego- 
t i a t i o n s .  
Since  t h e  e a r l y  days of game theory ( see  
von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) i t  has  
been hoped t h a t  game-theoretical  a n a l y s i s  
might he lp  t o  i n c r e a s e  our  understanding 
of c o n f l i c t s .  However, whi l e  game theory 
has  formalized many e s s e n t i a l  concepts i n  
t h i s  f i e l d ,  i ts  underlying assumptione-- 
namely, t h a t  p laye r s  behave i n  such a way 
a s  t o  maximize t h e i r  own u t i l i t y  function-- 
may s t i l l  l i m i t  i t s  p o t e n t i a l  use fu lness .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  formal models of bargaining 
( see ,  e.g., Roth, 1979) a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
suppor ted by exper imental  s t u d i e s  of bar- 
ga in ing  behavior (Roth, 1983); t h e  paradox 
of shor t -s ighted r a t i o n a l  behavior exemp- 
l i f i e d  by t h e  so-cal led  ' p r i soner ' s  
dilemma', which was solved long ago by 
an th ropo log i s t s  s tudying p r i m i t i v e  forms of 
-- 
b a r t e r , h a s  only recen t ly foundmore  formal 
r e s o l u t i o n  i n  evolut ionary game theory 
(Maynard-Smith, 1977; Axelrod, 1983; 
Hofs tadter ,  1983). 
The more appl icat ion-or iented mathematical  
approaches o f t e n  r e l y  on l e s s  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  
b u t  more r e l i a b l e  t o o l s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
dec i s ion- t r ee  a n a l y s i s  i s  f requen t ly  used 
t o  examine c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n s .  Dynamic 
s imula t ion  and gaming models a l s o  have a 
wide range of a p p l i c a t i o n s  (see ,  e.g. ,  
S t a h l ,  1983). However, d e s p i t e  t h e i r  many 
e x c e l l e n t  f e a t u r e s ,  gaming s imula t ion  
models and experiments do no t  g i v e  suf-  
f i c i e n t  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  p o s s i b l e  c o n f l i c t  
e s c a l a t i o n  o r  de-escala t ion p rocesses  
a r i s i n g  from t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  game. 
Although e s c a l a t i o n  and de-escala t ion have 
been observed i n  many gaming experiments,  
t h e r e  a r e  a s  y e t  no a n a l y t i c a l  t o o l s  t o  
help  us understand t h e s e  empi r i ca l  obser- 
va t ions .  The need f o r  f u r t h e r  r e sea rch  on 
such t o o l s  is t h e r e f o r e  v i t a l .  
1. While i t  i s  recognized t h a t  gaming 
s imula t ion  models and experiments a r a  a l -  
ready ve ry  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  c o n f l i c t  a n a l y s i s ,  
we a t tempt  t o  extend t h e s e  gaming simula- 
t i o n  techniques  by providing d e c i s i o n  sup- 
p o r t  based on concepts  and methods from game 
theory and m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  opt imizat ion.  
This l e a d s  t o  a new c l a s s  of gaming tech- 
niques which we c a l l  i n t e r a c t i v e  decision- 
suppor ted gaming. 
2. Many gaming experiments show t h a t  t h e  
p laye r s  do no t  t h i n k  i n  terms of o n e u t i l i t y  
func t ion ,  bu t  t r y  t o  balance s e v e r a l  g o a l s  
o r  o b j e c t i v e s .  Also,  p laye r s  do n o t  neces- 
s a r i l y  behave as maximizers, o f t e n  exhib- 
i t i n g  s a t i s f i c i n g  behavior  i n s t e a d  (see ,  
e.g., Simon, 1969). Thus, t h e  game- 
t h e o r e t i c a l  concepts  and methods used i n  
d e c i s i o n  suppor t  a r e  modified t o  t ake  t h i s  
m u l t w b j e c t i v e  and satisficing behavior  
i n t o  account.  
3. I n t e r a c t i v e  decision-supported gaming 
a s  desc r ibed  above can be used e i t h e r  a s  a 
means of teaching p l a y e r s  about t h e  p rocess  
of c o n f l i c t  escaLat ion,  o r  i n  conjunct ion 
wi th  formalized mediat ion procedures  t o  il- 
l u s t r a t e  how conflict d e - e s c a k t i o n  can be  
achieved. 
A COASTAL WATERS AND OPEN SEA 
FISHING GAME 
As an i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  l e t  us cons ide r  a 
f i s h i n g  game developed by M. S t a l e y  and 
C. Walters a t  I IASA.~  For s i m p l i c i t y ,  we 
s h a l l  l i m i t  t h e  problem t o  only  two coun- 
t r i e s  ( I  and 2) ;  they can f i s h  e i t h e r  i n  
t h e i r  own c o a s t a l  wa te r s  o r  i n  t h e  opensea .  
The f i s h  being caught is assumed t o  spawn 
i n  t h e  r i v e r s  of a g iven country  ( l i k e  sal- 
mon); thus ,  t h e  f i s h  r e t u r n  from t h e  open 
sea  t o  t h e s e  r i v e r s  each yea r  and i t  is 
reasonable  t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  s t o c k  of f i s h  
o r i g i n a t i n g  from each country.  Suppose t h e  
s t o c k s  i n  a g iven yea r  a r e  xi, i = 1 ,2 ;  t h e  
s i z e  of t h e  n a t i v e  f l e e t  f i s h i n g  i n  i t s  own 
c o a s t a l  wa te r s  is c ( f i s h i n g  i n  t h e  o t h e r  i 
country's  c o a s t a l  waters  is p r o h i b i t e d ) ;  
t h e  s i z e  of each f l e e t  f i s h i n g  i n  t h e  open 
sea  i s  si. Then t h e  ca tch  of each country 
can be approximated by 
where the  f i r s t  term d e s c r i b e s  t h e  c a t c h i n  
t h e  open s e a ,  t h e  second t h e  ca tch  i n  coas- 
t a l  wa te r s ,  f denote8 t h e  v a r i a b l e s  of t h e  
This  paper suggests  a number of new con- 
cep t s  and methods f o r  t h e  mathematical  
a n a l y s i s  of c o n f l i c t  p rocesses .  Thebas ic  
assumptions of t h i s  approach a r e  a s  fo l lows:  
P r i v a t e  communication; al though many ex- 
perimentshavebeenperformedwiththis game, 
a f u l l  d e s c r i p t i o n  has no t  y e t  been pub- 
11s hed . 
"other" country ,  and a is a  parameter.  
Like t h e  s t o c k ,  t h e  c a t c h  can be  measured 
d i r e c t l y  i n  monetary u n i t s ,  and should  be 
compared wi th  t h e  c o s t  of mainta in ing the  
f l e e t ,  p(ci+si). However, t h i s  a n a l y s i s  
cons ide r s  only  shor t - term b e n e f i t s  and 
c o s t s .  The long-term b e n e f i t s  can  be char- 
a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  s t o c k s  expected i n  t h e  
fo l lowing year :  
x r ( x  exp [-a(si+s3+ci)l 
i , t  
where r ( . )  is a  r ep roduc t ion  r a t e  coef-  
f i c i e n t .  Typ ica l ly ,  t h e  express ion  (2) is 
h igh ly  non l inea r  and random; i f  t h e  s tocks  
a r e  a l r eady  s t r o n g l y  d e p l e t e d ,  however, we 
can approximate (2)  by assuming 
r ( . )  = r = cons tan t .  Taking i n t o  account 
bo th  shor t -  and long-term b e n e f i t s  and 
c o s t s ,  t h e  payoff f u n c t i o n s  f o r  p l a y e r s  re-  
p r e s e n t i n g  both  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  
w i t h  z  eva lua ted  a t  x  = x i . The ac- i i , t  
t u a l  gaming model used i n  p r a c t i c e  may be 
considerably  more complicated than  t h e  
b a s i c  framework o u t l i n e d  above, i n c l u d i n g  
dynamic s i m u l a t i o n  o v e r  s e v e r a l  y e a r s ,  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  
f l e e t  through inves tment ,  t h e  u s e  of hatch- 
e r i e s ,  e t c .  A model of t h i s  type  has  been 
used i n  i n t e n s i v e  exper imenta l  gaming, w i t h  
some i n t e r e s t i n g  r e s u l t s .  Three c l u s t e r s  
of outcomes seem t o  emerge from t h e  gaming 
experiments.  One type  of r e s u l t  ( c a l l e d  
coopera t ive )  a r i s e s  when t h e  p l a y e r s  ag ree  
t a c i t l y  no t  t o  f i s h  too e x t e n s i v e l y ;  t h i s  
r e s u l t s  i n  high payoffs  qi and s t o c k s  
X i. t+l a t  t h e  end of t h e  game. The second 
type of r e s u l t  can b e  c a l l e d  dominated-- 
t h i s  occur s  when one p l a y e r  makes much 
h ighe r  ca tches  zi and r e c e i v e s  much higher  
payoffs  q  than t h e  o t h e r .  The t h i r d  type  i 
can be c a l l e d  d e s t r u c t i v e ;  i n  t h i s  case  
both  p l a y e r s  use  very  l a r g e  - f l e e t s ,  dras- 
t i c a l l y  reducing bo th  payof f s  and f u t u r e  
s t o c k s  of f i s h .  Moreover, t h e  p l a y e r s  
t y p i c a l l y  reduce  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  f l e e t  
f i s h i n g  i n  t h e i r  c o a s t a l  wa te r s  ci and 
i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  sea-going f l e e t  s Resu l t s  i ' 
of t h e s e  t h r e e  types have a l s o  been ob- 
se rved  i n  a c t u a l  f i s h i n g  d i s p u t e s  between 
neighbor ing c o u n t r i e s .  
The ques t ion  t h a t  w e  address  h e r e  is 
whether game-theoretical  a n a l y s i s  can he lp  
us t o  understand gaming r e s u l t s  such a s  these ,  
and t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  behavior  of p l aye r s  a s  
the  c o n f l i c t  develops.  The p r e s e n t  answer 
is a  q u a l i f i e d  yes ,  where t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
a r i s e s  from t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  of  c l a s s i c a l  
t o o l s .  F igure  1  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  image of 
t h e  game2 ( t h e  s e t  of a t t a i n a b l e  p a y o f f s ) ,  
c a l c u l a t e d  making t h e  s imple  assumptions 
x 1 q 2 = 5  , a=p=l , r ( . )= r -3  , si+c f [0;51 . 
By a  c l a s s i c a l  game a n a l y s i s ,  we can e a s i l y  
show t h a t  ci=O is op t ima l  f o r  both  p l a y e r s  
and t h a t  t h e  game has  s e v e r a l  noncooperative 
(Nash) e q u i l i b r i a  (Nash, 1950, 1953) denoted 
i n  Fig .  1  by No,  N1, N2; obviously ,  N is 0 
t h e  dominant Nash equ i l ib r ium and t h e  s i n g l e  
P a r e t o  p o i n t  f o r  t h e  game. 
Thus, how could i t  happen t h a t  p l a y e r s l e a v e  
t h e  p o i n t  N t o  produce r e s u l t s  c l u s t e r e d  0 
i n  r eg ions  ( I ) ,  (111, 112) ,  and (111) i n  
Fig .  l ?  How can we e x p l a i n  t h e  process  of 
c o n f l i c t  e s c a l a t i o n  t h a t  t y p i c a l l y  occurs  
i n  exper imenta l  gaming, and may be il- 
l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  sequence of p o i n t s  
(AO)-(A1 o r  A2)-A3-(A4 o r  A 5 ) 4  i n  Fig .  l ?  6 
To e x p l a i n  t h i s ,  we must assume t h a t  t h e  
p l a y e r s  a r e  mot ivated  by something more 
complicated than  s imple  payoff maximiza- 
t i on .  F i r s t ,  we observe  t h a t  t h e  po in t  No 
corresponds  t o  zero  c a t c h e s ,  z1=z2=0 . 
However, a  p o s i t i v e  c a t c h  is necessary  t o  
keep up t h e  f i s h  supply  (and t h e  cash  
f low);  hence,  both  p l a y e r s  must have more 
than one o b j e c t i v e ,  keeping an eye on 
f i n a l  payoffs  bu t  concen t ra t ing  on f i s h  
ca tches .  
We could now fol low t h e  c l a s s i c a l  approach 
and assume t h a t  t h e  p laye r s  have u t i l i t y  
o r  v a l u e  f u n c t i o n s  u l ( q l , z l )  and u2(q2,z2) 
t h a t  r e s u l t  i n  an equ i l ib r ium,  s a y ,  a t  t h e  
p o i n t  A However, t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  0 ' 
approach h a s  s e v e r a l  drawbacks i n  c o n f l i c t  
a n a l y s i s .  F i r s t ,  any in fo rmat ion  on 
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  has  c r u c i a l  s t r a t e g i c  
va lue  and is u s u a l l y  c a r e f u l l y  p r o t e c t e d ;  
t h e r e f o r e ,  we cannothope t h a t  f u l l  and 
p r e c i s e  in fo rmat ion  on u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  
w i l l  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  i n t o  
a  gaming model. Second, a  p rocess  of 
c o n f l i c t  e s c a l a t i o n  o r  de -esca la t ion  
u s u a l l y  invo lves  modi f i ca t ions  t o  t h e  
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s ,  s i n c e  exper imen ta l ly  ob- 
se rved  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  t y p i c a l l y  no t  
con tex t - f r ee  ( see ,  e .g . ,  Tversky, 1972). 
Th i rd ,  r e a l  p l a y e r s  u s u a l l y  do no t  t h i n k  i n  
terms of u t i l i t y  maximization, and even i f  
a s su red  t h a t  such in fo rmat ion  would be 
t r e a t e d  a s  c o n f i d e n t i a l ,  would f i n d  i t  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  communicate t h e i r  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n s  t o  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  (computer o r  
media tor) .  
A d e t a i l e d  mathematical  a n a l y s i s  is 
given i n  t h e  second p a r t  of t h i s  paper:  
" S a t i s f i c i n g  S e l e c t i o n s  of Game 
Equ i l ib r i a" .  
Therefore,  we adopt i n  t h i s  paper another  
approach t h a t  i s  both f l e x i b l e  and prag- 
matic and, a t  t h e  same time, opens new 
oppor tun i t i e s  f o r  c o n f l i c t  a n a l y s i s  and 
f o r  communication between p layers  and 
model. We assume t h a t  p l a y e r s  e i t h e r  ac- 
t u a l l y  th ink  i n  terms of aspiration levezs 
(Wierzbickl,  1982) f o r  t h e i r  va r ious  ob- 
j e c t i v e s ,  o r  can be taught t o  do so .  
Moreover, we assume t h a t  t h e s e  a s p i r a t i o n  
l e v e l s  can be adap t ive ly  modified during a  
gaming exerc i se .  We suppose t h a t  t h e  pro- 
cess  of a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l  formation occurs  
i n  p layers '  minds, b u t  t h a t  p layers  might 
be induced (by assurances o f  confiden- 
t i a l i t y )  t o  communicate t h e i r  cu r ren t  as- 
p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  t o  t h e  computer i n  order  
t o  rece ive ,  i n  r e t u r n ,  some dec i s ion  o r  
mediation support .  
To put  these  concepts i n t o  p r a c t i c e ,  we 
c a l c u l a t e  s e t s  of e q u i l i b r i a  such t h a t  t h e  
outcomes a r e  Pare to  f o r  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  
zi ' q i  of each p layer  but  noncooperative bet-  
ween players .  These s e t s  a r e  r a t h e r  l a r g e  
( see  s e t s  NP1, NP2 i n  Fig. 2 ) ,  bu t  exclude 
some outcomes ( s e t s  U1, U ) t h a t  a r e  un- 2  
s t a b l e  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  and dec i s ions  of 
e i t h e r  of t h e  p layers  (observe t h a t  t h e  
s e t s  of t y p i c a l  outcomes shown i n  Fig .  1 
l i e  almost completely w i t h i n  NPI, NP2). I f  
we add t o  t h e  image of t h e  game t h e  l i n e s  
of cons tan t  outcomes zi f o r  each p layer ,  
a s  i n  Fig.  2, we can e x p l a i n  the  process  
of c o n f l i c t  e s c a l a t i o n  through t h e  phe- 
nomenon of inflated aspirations. By in- 
f l a t e d  a s p i r a t i o n s  we mean a s p i r a t i o n s  
t h a t  exceed t h e  l i m i t s  imposed ( f o r  
example) by phys ica l ,  b i o l o g i c a l ,  and en- 
vironmental f a c t o r s :  t h e  r o l e  of t h e  
model is t o  represen t  these  n a t u r a l  l i m i t s  
and t o  he lp  t h e  p layers  t o  l e a r n  about 
them. 
Let  us now suppose t h a t  t h e  game is played 
r e p e t i t i v e l y  ( represen t ing  f i s h i n g  ac- 
t i v i t y  over many years )  and t h a t  both  
p layers  i n i t i a l l y  make dec i s ions  t h a t  l ead  
t o  outcome Ao,  corresponding t o  catches  
z 1 3 z 2 9  and payoffs  q1=q2?13 . I f  t h e  
p layers  behave cooperat ively ,  they can 
s t a y  c l o s e  t o  N =P and g a i n  high f u t u r e  0 
payoffs.  However, suppose p layer  1  wants 
to  expand and decides  t o  i n c r e a s e  h i s  
catch t o  z1=6 (po in t  A1) i n  o rder  t o  in- 
c rease  h i s  short-term r e t u r n s  and t o  f i -  
nance new investment i n  h i s  f i s h i n g  f l e e t .  
I f  the  o t h e r  p layer  does not r ec ip roca te .  
then p layer  1  succeeds i n  h i s  goa l s  and 
ob ta ins  a  dominant p o s i t i o n  i n  f u t u r e  
rounds. I f  p layer  2 r e c i p r o c a t e s ,  however, 
t h e  ca tch  of t h e  f i r s t  p layer  decreases  t o  
z  =z % (po in t  Ag). However, p layer  1  may 1 2  
have a l ready made l a r g e  investment comnit- 
ments and must inc rease  h i s  ca tch ;  thus ,  
he  might i n c r e a s e  h i s  f l e e t  and hence h i s  
c a t c h  s t i l l  f u r t h e r  (po in t  A ~ ) .  I f  t h e  
o t h e r  p layer  r e c i p r o c a t e s ,  t h e  outcome 
would be t h e  worst  Nash equi l ibr ium (N2), 
=z 5 5  and almost no f i s h  w i t h  catches  z l  2  
remaining f o r  t h e  fol lowing year .  This  
Nash equ i l ib r ium is not  very robust  t o  
mul t iob jec t ive  behavior wi th  i n f l a t e d  as- 
p i r a t i o n s ;  f u r t h e r  e s c a l a t i o n  can e a s i l y  
l ead  t o  t h e  a t t r i t i o n  po in t  A6 . 
Although one could l e a r n  much from t h e  
above simple example, and draw many anal- 
o g i e s  (f o r  example, t o  t h e  arms race )  , we 
s h a l l  conclude t h e  a n a l y s i s  wi th  the  ob- 
s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  behavior of p l a y e r s  i n  
such a  game can be explained,  f i r s t ,  by 
t h e i r  m u l t i p l e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  and second, by 
t h e i r  i n f l a t e d  a s p i r a t i o n s .  I f  they l e a r n  
quickly  t o  r e v i s e  t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  
downwards, they can su rv ive ;  however, i f  
they mainta in  t h e i r  i n f l a t e d  a s p i r a t i o n s  
only s l i g h t l y  too long,  c o n f l i c t  can es- 
c a l a t e  very speed i ly .  
Th i s  l e s son  can b e  taught  when playing 
s imula t ion  games; however, we then need 
t o  concentra te  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  of t h e p l a y e r s  
on t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n s .  I d e a l l y ,  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  support  system should produce a  
f u l l  image of t h e  game, such a s  t h a t  shown 
i n  Fig .  2. However, t h i s  might r e q u i r e  
excess ive  computer t ime f o r  more compli- 
cated games. F a i l i n g  t h i s ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
support  system could compute t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  
t h a t  each player  should adopt t o  come 
c l o s e  t o  some e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  asp i ra -  
t i o n  l e v e l s  of t h e i r  own, making c e r t a i n  
assumptions concerning t h e  a s p i r a t i o n  
l e v e l s  of t h e  o t h e r  p layers .  I n  o rder  t o  
achieve t h i s ,  we must in t roduce  some pr in-  
c i p l e s  f o r  selecting gwne equil ibria t h a t  
r e l a t e  t o  t h e  concept of a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  
and thus  t o  some form of sat i s f ic ing be- 
havior .  Although these  concepts apply t o  
mul t iob jec t ive  games, i t  is s imple r  t o  
i n t e r p r e t  them g r a p h i c a l l y  f o r  a  s ing le -  
o b j e c t i v e  game, provided i ts  s e t  of non- 
cooperat ive  e q u i l i b r i a  is l a r g e .  (Se t s  
of multiob j e c t i v e  noncooperative e q u i l i b r i a :  
a r e  genera l ly  l a r g e ,  g iv ing  t h e  p layers  a  
wider choice  of p o s s i b l e  outcomes i n  which 
they a r e  guided by t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n l e v e l s , )  
A "FISHING IN NEIGHBORS' 
COASTAL WATERS" GAME 
We consider  he re  a  s impl i f i ed  example of a  
game t h a t  has  only h i s t o r i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  
because most coun t r i es  now r e f r a i n  from 
f i s h i n g  i n  each o t h e r ' s  c o a s t a l  waters .  
Two coun t r i es ,  i = 1 , 2 ,  f i s h  i n  each o t h e r ' s ,  
r=2 ,1 ,  c o a s t a l  waters .  Each country can 
decide how much t o  take from f o r e i g n w a t e r s  
i (we denote t h i s  dec i s ion  by x ) and what 1  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  t o  impose on f o r e i g n  boa t s  
Fig.  1. Image of an open s e a  f i s h i n g  game. N , N  , N  a r e  noncoopera t ive  Nash e q u i l i b r i a ,  0 1 2  
w i t h  NO>N1>N2 . I ,  111, 112, I11 a r e  approximations of  t y p i c a l s e t s o f  exper imenta l  
outcomes. The s e r i e s  of  moves AO-(A1, A2)-A3-(A4, A )- e i t h e r  N o r  A6 r e p r e s e n t s  5 2 
a c o n f l i c t  e s c a l a t i o n  p rocess .  
Fig.  2. F u l l  image of an open s e a  f i s h i n g  game. N , N  , N  a r e  economic Nash e q u i l i b r i a ;  0 1 2  
NP1, NP a r e  s e t s  of m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  Nash-Pareto e q u i l i b r i a ;  U1, U a r e  s e t s  of  2 2 
u n s t a b l e  outcomes. The s e r i e s  of moves (A1, A2)-A3-(A4, A )-A6 r e p r e s e n t s  a 5 
process  of c o n f l i c t  e s c a l a t i o n  i n  which both  p laye r s  i n s i s t  on f i s h  ca tches  
z1=6, z2=6 . - 
i f i s h i n g  i n  t h e i r  wa te r s  ( x 2 ) ;  i f  t he  re- 
s t r i c t i o n s  a r e  disobeyed, both  t h e  offending 
country  and t h e  en fo rc ing  country i n c u r  ad- 
d i t i o n a l  c o s t s .  The payoff f u n c t i o n s  h a l e  
t h e  form: 
where (.)+ denotes  t ak ing  t h e  p o s i t i v e  
p a r t ,  aiO-ailx: r ep resen t s  t h e  n e t  g a i n  from 
t h e  country 's  own wa te r s  (d iminishing wi th  
i f i nc reased  f i s h i n g b y  o u t s i d e r s ) ,  ai2x1-ai3x2 
r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  n e t  g a i n  from f  i s h i n g  i n  f o r e i g n  
waters  (diminishing wi th  inc reased  r e s t r i c -  
t i o n s ) ,  t h e l a s t b u t  one t e r m r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  
p e n a l t i e s  f o r d i s o b e y i n g t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  of 
o t h e r c o u n t r i e s  and t h e l a s t  t e r m t h e  c o s t  of 
e n f o r c i n g i t s  w n r e s t r i c t i o n s .  A l l  deci- 
s i o n  v a r i a b l e s ,  r ' ( x :  , x i  ,x: ,x:)c n4 a r e  
cons t ra ined  by fiki 1 1 '  
This  exampleservestoillustratethemathe- 
m a t i c a l a n d  computationaldifficultiesin- 
volved i n  determining sets of noncooperat ive  
e q u i l i b r i a ;  3  however, t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  can 
beovercomeand the imageof  thegame, t o g e t h e r  
wi th  the  set of Nash e q u i l i b r i a  N is shown 
q ' 
i n  F ig .  3 f o r  aiO-2.4, ail-6, ai2-1, 
-1 
ai3=2, ai4=ai5=4, ~ ~ " 0 . 8 ,  j , i = 1 , 2  . The 
Nash e q u i l i b r i a  i n  t h i s  case  have a  r a t h e r  
s i m p l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n :  they correspond t o t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  which each country s t r i c t l y  obeys 
t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  of o t h e r s .  The Nash outcomes 
of thisgamearenotParetooutcomes; P a r e t o  
outcomes correspond todropp ing  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
e n t i r e l y ,  o r ,  a t  t h e  po in t  Po, t o  t h e  complete 
c e s s a t i o n o f  f i s h i n g i n  f o r e i g n w a t e r s .  It is 
i n t e r e s t i n g  t o n o t e  t h a t  t h e  p o i n t  Po has 
finallybeenreachedthrough t h e h i s t o r i c a l  
development of f i s h i n g  p r a c t i c e s  .4 
Th i s  is equ iva len t  t o  a  min-max problem in- 
volving nondif f e r e n t i a b l e  func t ions  t h a t  
do no t  remain convex a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  maxim- 
i z a t i o n ; s e e P a r t I I o f  t h i s  paper.  
The p o i n t  P  is no t  a Nash equ i l ib r ium f o r  0  
t h e o n e p e r i o d  game ,bu tcanbeshownto  b e a n  
evo lu t ionary  s t a b l e  e q u i l i b r i u m f o r  a  repe- 
t i t i v e g a m e .  Thuswemighthope t h a t  a l l  
' p r i s o n e r ' s  dilemmas' , charac te r i zed  by 
t h e d i f f e r e n c e  of Nash a n d P a r e t o  p o i n t s ,  
w i l l  f i n a l l y  b e r e s o l v e d i n a n e v o l u t i o n a r y  
way ( s e e a l s o H o f s t a d t e r ,  1983). In  t h e  case  
o f t h e a r m s  r a c e ,  h o w e v e r , i t i s b u t s m a l l  
c o n s o l a t i o n f o r  us t o  hope t h a t  o t h e r r a c e s  
i n t h e  universemight  l e a r n f r o m o u r  own 
evo lu t ionary  mistakes.  
However, i n  t h e  course  of t h i s  h i s t o r i c a l  
process t h e r e  have a l s o  been cases  i n  which 
the  wors t  p o i n t  SD has  been reached. Th i s  
p o i n t  is a t t a i n e d  when both  c o u n t r i e s  dec ide  
t o  f i s h  a s  much a s  p o s s i b l e  i n  e a c h o t h e r ' s  
waters  and, a t  the  same time, t o  impose and 
t r y  t o  en fo rce  extreme r e s t r i c t i o n s  on any- 
body f i s h i n g  i n  t h e i r  own waters--a case  of 
open f i s h i n g  war. There a r e  concepts i n  
game theory t h a t  e x p l a i n  t h e  development of 
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  a l b e i t  i n  a  r a t h e r  s i m p l i f i e d  
fashion.  
An o l d  concept i n  game theory is t h a t  of a  
Stackelberg equ i l ib r ium ( see ,  e  .g. , Aubin, 
1979). Suppose one of t h e  p laye r s  has  
enough in fo rmat ion  t o  compute t h e  re- 
sponses of t h e  o t h e r  p laye r s  (who wish t o  
maximize t h e i r  own payoffs)  t o  any of h i s  
own dec i s ions .  I f  t h e  responses  a r e  non- 
unique, he can  assume, t o  be  on t h e  s a f e  
s i d e ,  t h a t  only those  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e  l e a s t  
t o  h i s  own payoff w i l l  b e  chosen. These 
response f u n c t i o n s  uniquely  determine t h e  
dependence of  h i s  own payoff on h i s  own 
d e c i s i o n s ,  t ak ing  i n t o  account t h e  responses  
of o t h e r s ,  and h i s  own payoff can then  b e  
maximized. A p layer  who makes h i s  deci -  
s i o n s i n s u c h a w a y i s  c a l l e d t h e  (Stackelberg)  
l e a d e r ;  i f  o t h e r  p l a y e r s  respond a s  pre- 
d i c t e d ,  they a r e  c a l l e d  (Stackelberg)  f o l -  
lowers;  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  outcome is c a l l e d  t h e  
Stackelberg equ i l ib r ium ( t h i s  is one of  t h e  
Nash e q u i l i b r i a ,  chosen through t h e  ( sa fe )  
maximization of t h e  payoff of  t h e  l e a d e r ) .  
I n  t h e  example considered he re ,  i f  t h e  
f i r s t  p l a y e r  wants t o  b e  t h e  l e a d e r ,  he 
concludes t h a t  by sending t h e  l a r g e s t  pos- 
s i b l e  f l e e t  t o  f i s h  i n  h i s  opponent 's  
waters  and by imposing t h e  s e v e r e s t  p o s s i b l e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on i n t r u d e r s  i n t o  h i s  ovn 
waters ,  he might f o r c e  t h e  o t h e r  p l a y e r  t o  
"follow" him. Indeed, s i n c e  both  enfo rc ing  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  and v i o l a t i n g  them a r e  ve ry  
c o s t l y  i n  t h i s  game, t h e  second p layermigh t  
maximize h i s  own shor t - term i n t e r e s t s  by 
imposing on ly  t h e  minimal r e s t r i c t i o n s  com- 
p a t i b l e  wi th  t h e  f l e e t  of t h e  l e a d e r  ( o r  
even dropping r e s t r i c t i o n s  a l together- -but  
t h e  l e a d e r  cannot count on t h i s )  and 
sending on ly  t h e  s m a l l e s t  p o s s i b l e  f l e e t  
t o  t h e  l e a d e r ' s  waters .  
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  shows, however, t h a t  
the  reasoning of t h e  Stackelberg l e a d e r  is 
completely u n r e a l i s t i c  i f  no a d d i t i o n a l  
l e g a l  o r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c i rcumstances  f o r c e  
t h e  o t h e r  p l a y e r  t o  become a  fol lower .  A 
sovereign country  would no t  accep t  t h e f o l -  
lower ' s  r o l e  and would denounce a s  hypo- 
c r i t i c a l  t h e  exp lana t ions  o f t h e a s p i r i n g  
l e a d e r  t h a t  t h e  fo l lower ' s  r o l e  is l o g i c a l  
f r o m t h e p o i n t o f  vlewof economicpayoffs.  I n  
t h e  example considered he re ,  t h e  second p l a y e r  
migh twe l l r e spondby  r e p e a t i n g t h e  a c t i o n s  of 
t h e  f i r s t - - t h i s  would r e s u l t  i n  a  So-called 
Stackelberg d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  ( a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  
whichboth p l a y e r s  t r y  tobecomethe  l e a d e r )  
and corresponds t o  an open f i s h i n g  war i n  
our example. 
F i g .  3. Image of  t h e  game: q l  = f l ( x )  2 1  2  1 2  2  1 2.4-6x1+x1-2x2-4 [(x1+x2-l)++(x 1 +x 2- I)+]  
F i g .  4. S a t i s f i c i n g  game e q u i l i b r i a  t h a t  cou ld  b e  s e l e c t e d  by p l a y e r  2: SC r e p r e s e n t s  a  2 
c o n s t r u c t i v e  s a t i s f i c i n g  move; SD2 r e p r e s e n t s  a h idden  d e s t r u c t i v e  s a t i s f i c i n g  
move; OD r e p r e s e n t s  a n  open ly  d e s t r u c t i v e  move. s(q-q) r e p r e s e n t s  a maximized 2 
f u n c t i o n  t h a t  h e l p s  t o  s e l e c t  a c o n s t r u c t i v e  s a t i s f i c i n g  s t r a t e g y .  
Thus, the  concepts of Stackelberg leader- 
sh ip  and Stackelberg d i sequ i l ib r ium explain  
how open c o n f l i c t s  can occur--however, t h e  
explanat ion i s  not  completely s a t i s f a c t o r y  
s i n c e  c o n f l i c t s  do no t  u s u a l l y  develop t o  
t h i s  s c a l e  immediately. H i s t o r i c a l e v i d e n c e  
shows t h a t  i f  one country were t o  send its 
f i s h i n g  f l e e t  t o  ano ther ' s  wa te r s ,  t h e  
o the r  country would not n e c e s s a r i l y  recip- 
roca te ;  i n  o rder  t o  secure  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
support ,  t h e  i n j u r e d  country would p r e f e r  
t o  l i m i t  t h e  f i s h i n g  war t o  i ts  own waters.  
We t h e r e f o r e  need some a d d i t i o n a l  concepts 
t h a t  could exp la in  t h e  processes  of con- 
f l i c t  e s c a l a t i o n  and de-escalation. 
SATISFICING BEHAVIOR AND 
SELECTION OF GAME EQUI- 
LIBRIA 
We have a l ready seen t h a t  c o n f l i c t  es- 
c a l a t i o n  might be caused by some p layers  
having i n f l a t e d  a s p i r a t i o n s ,  1.e.. wishing 
t o  exceed t h e  l i m i t s  imposed by t h e n a t u r a l  
(physical ,  b i o l o g i c a l ,  e t c . )  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of t h e  game. We should t h e r e f o r e  consider  
a  type of decision-making behavior r e l a t e d  
t o  t h e  concept of a s p i r a t i o n  levels-- 
s a t i s f i c i n g  behavior.  As o r i g i n a l l y  in- 
troduced (Simon, 1959). t h i s  type of b e  
havior  is based on t h e  idea  t h a t a d e c i s i o n -  
maker does not opt imize due t o  uncer ta in ty  
about va r ious  aspec t s  of t h e  problem, in- 
cluding t h e  r e a c t i o n s  of o t h e r  decision- 
makers, and is thus  s a t i s f i e d  i f  he reaches  
c e r t a i n  adap t i v e l y  formed a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  
f o r  s p e c i f i c  o b j e c t i v e s .  This does not ex- 
p l a i n ,  however, what a  decision-maker would 
do i f  c e r t a i n  outcomes were below h i s  as- 
p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s ;  we might s a f e l y  assume 
t h a t  he  would f i r s t  try t o  reach h i s  as- 
p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  (which i s  equ iva len t  t o  
maximizing t h e  outcomes i f  they a r e  below 
these  levels--see Kortanek and Pfou t s ,  
1982) and would then e i t h e r  r e s t  a f t e r  
achieving h i s  t a r g e t s ,  o r  change h i s  as- 
p i r a t i o n s .  This type of behavior w i l l  be 
c a l l e d  strict sat is f im'ng;  although ofcon-  
s i d e r a b l e  i n t e r e s t , S  i t  is s t i l l  not suf- 
f  i c i e n t l y  f l e x i b l e  t o  exp la in  t h e  process 
of c o n f l i c t  e s c a l a t i o n .  
A more f l e x i b l e  concept is t h a t  of q w s i -  
s a t i s f i c i n g  b e h m ~ i o r  : players  maximize 
t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s ,  but wi th  a  g r e a t e r  in- 
t e n s i t y  below t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  than 
above them. Mathematically, such a  d i s -  
t i n c t i o n  seems t o  have no sense:  payoff 
maximization behavior is no t  changed by t h e  
i n t e n s i t y  of maximization, and t h e  s e t  of 
Nash e q u i l i b r i a  is not changed by assuming 
q u a s i - s a t i s f i c i n g  behavior.  However,quasi- 
s a t i s f i c i n g  behavior might in f luence  t h e  
way a  p layer  sele-cts a  Nash equi l ibr ium: 
having a t t a i n e d  h i s  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l ,  he 
might devote h i s  remaining freedomof a c t i o n  
t o  some o t h e r  purpose , suchas  cons t ruc t ive ly  
See P a t t  I1 of t h i s  paper. 
prevent ing c o n f l i c t  e s c a l a t i o n  by l e t t i n g  
o t h e r  p layers  maximize t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s ,  
o r  d e s t r u c t i v e l y  hur t ing  o t h e r  p l a y e r s  by 
t r y i n g  t o  negat ively  a f f e c t t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s .  
I n  the  example from t h e  previous  s e c t i o n ,  
t h e  s a t i s f i c i n g  Nash e q u i l i b r i a  f o r  p l a y e r  
2, who has  some a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l  y2 ,  a r e  
a l l  of t h e  Nash e q u i l i b r i a  above and in- 
cluding t h e  l i n e  q2=t2 ( see  Fig.  4)  . 
S e l e c t i o n  of t h e  po in t  SC2 t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  
q  =q and is a l s o  good f o r  t h e  o t h e r  p l a y e r  2  2  
i s  a  c o m t r u c t i v e  s a t i s f i c i n g  s t r a t e g y ;  
s e l e c t i o n  of t h e  po in t  OD2, which is t h e  
worst  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  p layer ,  i s  an 
openly d e s t r u c t i v e  ~ t r a t e g y ; ~  s e l e c t i o n  of 
t h e  po in t  SD2 t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  q  =p b u t  is 2 2 
t h e  worst  choice  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  p layer  on 
t h i s  l i n e  is a hidden d e s t r u c t i v e  satis- 
f i c i n g  s t r a t e g y .  The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between c o n s t r u c t i v e  and hidden 
d e s t r u c t i v e  s a t i s f i c i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  i n  t h e  
example considered is q u i t e  i n t e r e s t i n g .  
The parameters of t h e  example a r e  such t h a t  
f i s h  s tocks  a r e  a l ready  heav i ly  depleted 
and f i s h i n g  i n  c o a s t a l  waters  h u r t s  t h e  
h o s t  country more than  i t  b e n e f i t s  t h e  
f i s h i n g  country.  A c o n s t r u c t i v e  satis- 
f i c i n g  s t r a t e g y  is then t o  decrease  a s  much 
a s  p o s s i b l e  your ca tch  i n  t h e  c o a s t a l  
waters  o f  o t h e r s  (bear ing i n  mind your 
economic a s p i r a t i o n s ) ,  whi le  imposing t h e  
s t r i c t e s t  p o s s i b l e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on o u t s i d e r s  
f i s h i n g  i n  your own waters .  A hidden 
d e s t r u c t i v e  s t r a t e g y  is t o  achieve t h e  same 
economic a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l  by f i s h i n g  as much 
a s  p o s s i b l e  i n  t h e  c o a s t a l  waters  of o t h e r s  
and imposing only such r e s t r i c t i o n s  on 
fo re igners  f i s h i n g  i n  your own waters  as 
a r e  necessary t o  a t t a i n  your a s p i r a t i o n  
l e v e l .  Each hidden d e s t r u c t i v e  s t r a t e g y  
can be ' r a t i o n a l i z e d '  by invoking some 
seemingly p l a u s i b l e  argument, f o r  example, 
' w e  b e l i e v e  i n  t h e  freedom of f i s h i n g  and 
r e s t r i c t  i t  only out  of economic n e c e s s i t y ' ;  
never the less ,  i t  s t i l l  remains d e s t r u c t i v e  
i n  t h e  eyes  of t h e  o t h e r  player .  
A s a t i s f i c i n g  game equ i l ib r ium can be 
s e l e c t e d  u n i l a t e r a l l y  when t h e  a s p i r a t i o n  
l e v e l s  of a  p a r t i c u l a r  p layer  and t h e  type 
of a c t i o n  t o  be taken (cons t ruc t ive ,  hidden 
d e s t r u c t i v e ,  e t c . )  a r e  known; i f  t h e m u l t i p l e  
o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  o the r  s i d e  a r e t o b e t a k e n  
i n t o  account,  i t  i s  a l s o  necessary t o  have 
a t  l e a s t  es t imated a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  f o r  
t h e  o t h e r  s i d e .  I n  f a c t ,  no mat te r  whether 
you want t o  be c o n s t r u c t i v e  o r  d e s t r u c t i v e ,  
you must have some i d e a  of t h e  a s p i r a t i o n s  
of t h e  o t h e r  player-say, what economic and 
what eco log ica l  r e s u l t s  would s a t i s f y  him; 
only when you assume ( s i m p l i s t i c a l l y )  t h a t  
- 
I n  t h i s  case  (although not n e c e s s a r i l y  i n  
g e n e r a l ) ,  t h e  openly d e s t r u c t i v e  s t r a t e g y  
OD coincides  wi th  t h e  Stackelberg 2  
maximizing s t r a t e g y .  
t he  o t h e r  p laye r  has only a  s i n g l e  ob- 
j e c t i v e  can you d i s regard  h i s  a s p i r a t i o n s .  
A s a t i s f i c i n g  game equ i l ib r ium f o r  a  g iven 
mathematical  model of t h e  game can a l s o  be  
computed by maximizing an appropr ia t e func-  
t i o n  over t h e  s e t  of Nash ( o r  Pareto-Nash 
i n  t h e  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  case)  game equi- 
l i b r i a .  I n  t h e  s imple  example considered 
he re ,  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i v e  s a t i s f i c i n g  o p t i o n  
f o r  p laye r  2  wi th  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l  i2 can 
be computed by so lv ing  t h e  fol lowing pro- 
lem : 
1 - 
maximize - (f 2(x)-q2)+ - 
a P 
where 
~ m t f i :  min 4(x,y)-0) ; 
+x - 
and p>>1 is a  c o e f f i c i e n t .  I f  w e  denote  
1 - 
s (q - i )=  (q2-a2)+ - p(qiq2)+ + q1 9 
then t h e  equ iva len t  problem max s(q-a) 
qaq 
can be  i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  outcome space a s  
shown i n  Fig .  4. We s e e  t h a t  i t  is neces- 
s a r y  t o  maximize a  n o n d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  func- 
t i o n  over  a  non-convex set: a l though  t h i s  
is a  d i f f i c u l t  problem, i t  i s  no t  beyond 
t h e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  of modern op t imiza t ion  
techniques  ( see  Nurminski, 1982; Demyanov, 
1983). 
CONFLICT ESCALATION AND 
DE-ESCALATION 
Figure  5 i l l u s t r a t e s  a  process  of c o n f l i c t  
e s c a l a t i o n ,  s t r u c t u r e d  us ing t h e  concept 
of s e l e c t i n g  s a t i s f i c i n g  e q u i l i b r i a .  We 
assume t h a t  both p l a y e r s  have chosen 
s a t i s f i c i n g  c o n s t r u c t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  
- SC1, SC2 a t  some { 1,q2 , bu t  t h e s e  as- 
p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  a r e  mutually incompat ible  
and thus  t h e  o v e r a l l  r e s u l t  of t h e s e  two 
dec i s ions ,  OO , is n o t  an equ i l ib r ium 
po in t .  Suppose t h a t  p laye r  1  decides ,  i n  
t h e  next  round, t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  asp i ra -  
t i o n s  of p laye r  2  downwards by choosing 
hidden d e s t r u c t i v e  SD1 ; p layer  2  does  no t  
change h i s  s t r a t e g y ,  and t h e  j o i n t  outcome 
is O1 . However, s i n c e  p laye r  2  w i l l  pro- 
bably recognize  t h e  d e s t r u c t i v e  c h a r a c t e r  
of t h e  move of p laye r  1 ,  he w i l l  no t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  respond by r e v i s i n g  h i s  as- 
p i r a t i o n s  downwards; he might r a t h e r  choose 
an  openly d e s t r u c t i v e  po l i cy  OD2 , which 
' See P a r t  I1 of  t h i s  paper.  
l e a d s  t o  t h e  outcome 0  i n  t h e  next round. 2  
I f  p l a y e r  1 r e c i p r o c a t e s ,  t h e  nex t  round 
r e s u l t s  i n  an open f i s h i n g  war, o3 • BY 
playing a  game of t h i s  type  s t r u c t u r e d  
us ing  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  and t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between c o n s t r u c t i v e  and d e e t r u c t i v e  be- 
hav io r ,  p a r t i c i p a n t s  can l e a r n  much about 
t h e  dynamics of c o n f l i c t  e s c a l a t i o n .  
S i m i l a r  techniques  can b e  used t o  i l l u e t -  
r a t e  c o n f l i c t  de-escala t ion;  however, i m -  
p l i c i t  o r  e x p l i c i t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o r  medi- 
a t i o n  a r e  needed f o r  c o n f l i c t  de-escalation,  
w e n  i f  t h i s  only  invo lves  u n i l a t e r a l  deci -  
s ions .  We use  t h e  term " i m p l i c i t  nego- 
t i a t i o n s "  t o  d e s c r i b e  a  u n i l a t e r a l  s t a t e -  
ment from one of t h e  p l a y e r s  t h a t  he wants 
t o  de-escala te  c o n f l i c t ;  he then  modif ies  
h i s  a c t i o n s  i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of s i m i l a r  be- 
hav io r  from t h e  o t h e r  s i d e .  I n  e x p l i c i t  
n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  however, he would d i s c u s s  
such a c t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  b e f o r e  
a c t u a l l y  implementing them. Mediation in- 
volves  a  t h i r d  p a r t y  who a s s i s t s  i n  t h e  
nego t i a t ions .  These well-known s i t u a t i o n s  
can be i l l u s t r a t e d  by a  gaming model used 
i n  a  decision-support  mode. Even i f  t h e  
a c t u a l  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  of each p layer  
should b e  t r e a t e d  a s  c o n f i d e n t i a l  by t h e  
decision-support  system ( p r e c i s e  knowledge 
of t h e  a s p i r a t i o n s  of t h e  .o ther  s i d e  g i v e s  
a  p laye r  a  s t r a t e g i c  advantage) ,  decis ion-  
supported gaming he lps  t h e  p l a y e r s  both  t o  
a d j u s t  t h e i r  am a s p i r a t i o n s  and t o  l e a r n  
about t h e  a s p i r a t i o n s  of t h e  o t h e r s .  
A s imple  process  of t h i s  type  is i l l u s -  
t r a t e d  i n  Fig.  6. Suppose both  p l a y e r s  
have chosen c o n s t r u c t i v e  s a t i s f i c i n g  moves 
SC and SC , bu t  t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n  
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l e v e l s  a r e  f a r  from being compatible and 
t h e  r e s u l t  of t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s  is OO. Sup- 
pose,  through i m p l i c i t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o r  
under t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of t h e  mediator ,  p l a y e r  
1 decides  t o  r e v i s e  h i s  a s p i r a t i o n s  down- 
ward and chooses a  c o n s t r u c t i v e  s a t i s -  
f i c i n g  s t r a t e g y  SC1,2 ; t h i s  l e a d s  t o  O 2  
i n  t h e  next  round, which is s l i g h t l y  b e t t e r  
f o r  p l a y e r  1  and much b e t t e r  f o r  p laye r  2. 
The c r u c i a l  p o i n t  is whether p l a y e r  2  w i l l  
r e c i p r o c a t e ;  i f  he does,  choosing SC 
2,2 
which l e a d s  t o  outcome O 2  , t hen  p layer  1 
might be  motivated t o  go f u r t h e r ,  s e l e c t i n g  
SC1,3 and outcome 0  ; p l a y e r  2  may then 3  
s e l e c t  SC and outcome 0  
2.3 4 ' 
A t  t h i s  
p o i n t ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  between a s p i r a t i o n  
l e v e l s  and a c t u a l  outcomes a r e  s o  low t h a t  
t h e  p laye r s  can agree  t o  accep t  t h e  out-  
come O4 a s  a  nego t i a t ed  s t a t u s  quo. 
An a c t i v e  mediator c a n b e h e l p f u l  even when 
p layer s  w i l l  no t  consider  m u l t i l a t e r a l  ac- 
t i o n s  and proceed u n i l a t e r a l l y ;  i n  f a c t ,  a 
mediator might even be necessary  t o  s t i m -  
u l a t e  c o n f l i c t  de-escala t ion through uni- 
l a t e r a l  a c t i o n .  I f  t h e  mediator enjoys  t h e  
Fig. 5 .  A case  of c o n f l i c t  e sca la t ion .  SC1,  SC represent s a t i s f i c i n g  construct ive  moves 2  
f o r  players 1  and 2 ;  S D 1 ,  S D  represent s a t i s f i c i n g  (hidden) destruct ive  moves 2  
f o r  players 1  and 2 ;  OD1, OD represent openly destruct ive  moves f o r  players 1  and 2  
2 .  The c o n f l i c t  e sca la t ion  process i s  represented by ( S C  S C 2 ) 3 0  ; 1 '  
(SD1 ,  S C 2 ) q 1  ; ( S D 1 ,  O D 2 ) q 2  ; (OD1, O D 2 ) q 3  . 
Fig. 6 .  A case of c o n f l i c t  de-escalation: ( s c l , l ,  s c 2 ,  l)*o; ( s c 1 , 2 ,  s c 2 , 1 ) q 1  ; 
( S C 1 , 2 .  S C 2 , 2 ) q 2  ; ( S C 1 , 3 ,  S C 2 , 2 ) q 3  ; ( S C 1 , 3 ,  S C 2 , 3 ) q 4  . 
confidence of both  s i d e s  and knows t h e i r  
a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s ,  h e  can mediate  i n  t h e  
choice of game equil ibria (Fig.  7 ) .  To do 
t h i s ,  he  could use  t h e  in fo rmat ion  con- 
t a ined  i n  two p o i n t s :  t h e  c u r r e n t  outcome 
of t h e  game, p o i n t  O,, , with outcomelevels  
- - 
q1,q2 , and t h e  c u r r e n t  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  
- - 
ql ,q2 . A game equ i l ib r ium s e l e c t e d  v i a  
mediat ion can be de f ined ,  f o r  example, a s  
a  s o l u t i o n  of t h e  problem: 
a = max emin (fi(x)-i i)  / (Qi-Gi) (7)  
a 1-1,2 
where N is def ined  a s  i n  (6) .  The v a l u e  
of a (measured a s  t h e  d i s t a n c e  between t h e  
c u r r e n t  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  and t h e  cu r ren t  
outcome) g ives  some i d e a  of how much both  
s i d e s  should  decrease  t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n  
l e v e l s  i n  o rde r  f o r  t h e  p l a y e r s  t o  uni- 
l a t e r a l l y  s e l e c t  mutual ly  c o n s i s t e n t  game 
e q u i l i b r i a .  
C lea r ly ,  t h e  p laye r s  might do much b e t t e r  
by agreeing on m u l t i l a t e r a l  a c t i o n ,  
l ead ing  t o  outcomes i n  t h e  neighborhood of 
t h e  p o i n t  Po . However, e x p l i c i t  nego- 
t i a t i o n s  o r  mediat ion a r e  r equ i red  t o  ob- 
t a i n  agreement on m u l t i l a t e r a l  a c t i o n  (such 
a s  the  h i s t o r i c  agreement on sovereignty  
over c o a s t a l  wa te r s ) .  
MEDIATION TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT 
ON MULTILATERAL AmION 
Attempts t o  reach agreement on mul t i -  
l a t e r a l  a c t i o n  always s t a r t  wi th  an assess-  
ment of t h e  noncooperative s t a t u s  quo. The 
s t a t u s  quo is n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a  r e s u l t  of 
c o n f l i c t  de-escala t ion,  such a s  t h e  po in t  
O, i n  Fig.  6; i t  could j u s t  a s  w e l l  be t h e  
r e s u l t  of c o n f l i c t i n g  s t r a t e g i e s ,  such a s  
t h e  p o i n t  OO . However, a  s t a t u s  quo can 
always be e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  a  gaming model, 
i f  only by repeated gaming s imula t ions .  
Actual n e g o t i a t i o n s  o f t e n  proceed wi thout  
a  mediator ,  and a r e  s t r u c t u r e d  by t h e  pro- 
posa l s  o r  p o s i t i o n s  of t h e  p a r t i e s  in-  
volved; t h e s e  p o s i t i o n s  a r e  success ive ly  
modified i n  t h e  course  of n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
While t h e  dynamics of such n e g o t i a t i o n s  
a r e ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  a  ve ry  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o p i c  
( see  Ra i f fa ,  1982), w e  s h a l l  l i m i t  our  a t -  
t e n t i o n  h e r e  t o  n e g o t i a t i o n s  involving a  
mediator.  By agreeing t o  t h e  use  of a  
gaming model t h a t  r e p r e s e n t s  some sub- 
s t a n t i v e  (phys ica l ,  b i o l o g i c a l ,  e t c . )  as- 
p e c t s  of t h e  system, t h e  p a r t i e s  involved 
a l s o  i m p l i c i t l y  agree  t o  t h e  model a s  
mediator.  As a  s t a r t i n g  po in t  f o r  p o s s i b l e  
f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  we s h a l l a l s o  assume 
t h a t  t h e  p a r t i e s  involved a l s o  agree  on 
some r u l e s  of f a i r n e s s  f o r  d i v i d i n g  t h e  
b e n e f i t s  gained from m u l t i l a t e r a l  a c t i o n ,  
and on t h e  use and assessment of t h e  pro- 
p o s a l s  generated by t h e  d e c i s i o n  and 
mediat ion suppor t  system according t o  
t h e s e  accepted r u l e s  of f a i r n e s s  ( see  
F i s h e r  and Ury , 1981). 
There a r e  many p r i n c i p l e s  by which common 
ga ins  o r  c o s t s  measured i n  comparable u n i t s  
can be d iv ided  f a i r l y  among t h e  p a r t i c i -  
pan t s  : t h e r e  is t h e  c l a s s i c a l  p r i n c i p l e  
'one d i v i d e s ,  t h e  o t h e r  chooses ' ;  t h e  
Ste inhaus  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  of t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  
t o  many p a r t i c i p a n t s ;  and many o t h e r  pro- 
cedures of va r ious  types  ( s e e  Young et a l . ,  
1982). There a r e  a l s o  many ways of 
de f in ing  coopera t ive  solutions t o  s ing le -  
payoff games ( t h e  concepts of co re ,  
nuc leo lus ,  Shapley va lue ,  etc.--seeShapley,  
1965; Aubin, 1979); however, t h e s e  concepts 
a r e  n o t  e a s i l y  extended t o  m u l t i o b j e c t i v e  
games. A  type  of coopera t ive  s o l u t i o n  t h a t  
can be r e l a t i v e l y  easy extended t o  mul t i -  
o b j e c t i v e  games was proposed f i r s t  by 
R a i f f a  and then by Ka la i  and Smorodinsky 
(1975); w e  p r e s e n t  a  modi f i ca t ion  of t h i s  
i d e a  a s  a  p o s s i b l e  p r i n c i p l e  f o r  f a i r  
d i v i s i o n  of j o i n t  g a i n s  made i n  a  mul t i -  
o b j e c t i v e  game. 
Assume t h a t  a  noncooperative s t a t u s  quo 
has  been reached i n  t h e  game ( f o r  example, 
through s i m u l a t i o n  gaming, o r  noncoopera- 
t i v e  gaming wi th  d e c i s i o n  suppor t )  . Let 
if denote  t h e  s t a t u s  quo va lue  of t h e  j - th  
J 
o b j e c t i v e  o r  outcome f o r  t h e  i - t h  p l a y e r ,  
and assume t h a t  a l l  outcomes should .  be 
maximized. Then t h e  d e c i s i o n  suppor t  sys- 
tem can compute the  maximum p o s s i b l e  in- 
creaseinthevalueofeachobjective f o r  each 
p l a y e r ,  assuming cooperat ion between 
p l a y e r s  : 
i . f  --f 
- max f  x  ; x = : f J ( x ) h j  , 
j  f i g  j 
f o r  a l l  f , j  # i , j l  (8) 
These maximum c o o p e r a t i v e i n c r e a s e s  Aq i 1 
a r e  taken a s  u n i t s  i n  the  a l e  used t o  
a l l o c a t e  j o i n t  gains .  According t o  t h i s  
i 
r u l e ,  t h e  cooperat ive  g a i n s  q  (x) - ..i j  j  
r e s u l t i n g  from some m u l t i l a t e r a l  d e c i s i o n  
x a r e  a l l o c a t e d  f a i r l y  i f  
f o r  a l l  i , j  (9) 
where 
P 4 
and P denotes  t h e  number of o b j e c t i v e s  i 
considered by each player .  The X! a r e  
J 
c o r r e c t i v e  s c a l i n g  c o e f f i c i e n t s  s p e c i f i e d  
by each p layer  a f t e r  reviewing proposed 
coopera t ive  outcomes, and i n d i c a t e  how he 
would p r e f e r  t o  a l l o c a t e  g a i n s  among h i s  
own o b j e c t i v e s .  (Thedec i s ion  suppor t  sys- 
tem can s t a r t  wi th  t h e  assumption t h a t  
Ai=l/pi . ) However, s i n c e  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  j 
sum t o  1 f o r  each p l a y e r ,  and a i s  a j o i n t  
c o e f f i c i e n t  f o r  a l l  p l a y e r s ,  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  
of ga ins  between p l a y e r s  is determined 
(using t h e  r u l e  of f a i r  d i v i s i o n )  by the  
p ropor t ion  of a c t u a l  g a i n s  t o  t h e  maximum 
coopera t ive  gains .  
C lea r ly ,  such a  r u l e  must have some ad hoc 
c h a r a c t e r ,  al though i t  must a l s o  possess  
c e r t a i n  normative p r o p e r t i e s .  It should 
be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e r e  is no u l t i m a t e  
p r i n c i p l e  of f a i r n e s s  i n  any complicated 
game (say,  a s p o r t i n g  game) and t h a t  i d e m  
of f a i r n e s s  develop h i s t o r i c a l l y :  a  s e t  of 
r u l e s  is f a i r  i f  i t  does not  fundamentally 
f avor  any of t h e  p l a y e r s  and i f  i t  is ac- 
cep t e d  by a l l  p l aye r s .  
Following t h e  r u l e s  of f a i r n e s s  (8-lo),  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  and mediat ion suppor t  system 
could compute a  d e c i s i o n  x  t h a t  would 
maximize t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  a i n  (9) f o r g i v e n  
A; . However, s i n c e  t h e  p laye r s  should 
have time t o  a s s e s s  t h e  proposed coopera- 
t i v e  outcomes and t o  a d j u s t  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  
of gains  among t h e i r  own o b j e c t i v e s  by 
modifying Ai , t h e  mediation suppor t  sys- j 
tern should not  propose maximum ga ins  
(maxirmun a )  i n  t h e  f i r s t  i t e r a t i o n .  I f  t h e  
l a r g e s t  a t t a i n a b l e  v a l u e  of a is,  say ,  am , 
t h e  f i r s t  i t e r a t i o n  should produce a  co- 
o p e r a t i v e  dec i s ion  t h a t  would s a t i s f y  (9) 
wi th  a = $am , where E(O;l) is a chosen 
c o e f f i c i e n t .  This proposal  can then  be 
p resen ted ,  toge the r  wi th  its outcomes, f o r  
assessment by t h e  p laye r s .  There a r e  two 
main ques t ions  here:  whether t h e  proposed 
d e c i s i o n  is accep tab le  t o  a l l  p l a y e r s ,  and 
whether they would l i k e  t o  modify previous  
A . I f  a l l  p l a y e r s  a g r e e ,  t h a t  t h e  pro- 
posed d e c i s i o n  is  accep tab le ,  then t h e  
process  is repeated us ing t h i s  d e c i s i o n  a s  
a  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t ;  i f  n o t ,  t h e  previous  ac- 
cep tab le  d e c i s i o n  ( t h e  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t )  is  
adopted ( t h e  s t a t u s  quo i s  by d e f i n i t i o n  
accep tab le ) .  Under a d d i t i o n a l  procedural  
r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  t h i s  process  can be shown t o  
converge t o  a  Pa re to  coopera t ive  d e c i s i o n  
and outcome ( see  Pa r t  I1 of t h i s .  paper) .  
I n  a  s i n g l e  payoff game, such a s  t h a t  il- 
l u s t r a t e d  i n  Fig.  8 ,  t h i s  process  is  very 
s imple ,  s i n c e  t h e  p laye r s  cannot i n f l u e n c e  
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of inc reas ing  ga ins  i n  out- 
come space;  i n  a  mul t iob jec t ive  game, how- 
ever ,  they can in f luence  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n ,  
but only i n  t h e  subspace conta ining t h e i r  
own outcomes of i n t e r e s t .  
See P a r t  I1 of t h i s  paper.  
F i n a l l y ,  we should s t r e s s  t h e  obvious f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  and mediat ion suppor t  . 
system descr ibed h e r e  addresses  only a s m a l l  
s u b s e t  of the  problems t h a t  might be en- 
countered i n  mediation.  For example, t o  
o b t a i n  s p e c i f i c  agreements t h a t  s t a b i l i z e  
coopera t ive  Pa re to  s o l u t i o n s  would r e q u i r e  
an  independent a n a l y s i s .  Although a  Pa re to  
coopera t ive  s o l u t i o n  might be s t a b i l i z e d  
over a number of s e s s i o n s  through t h e  s imple  
t h r e a t  of a  r e t u r n  t o  a  noncooperative 
equ i l ib r ium worse f o r  a l l  p l a y e r s ,  t h e  way 
i n  which a  r e p e t i t i v e  p r i s o n e r ' s  dilemma 
problem i s  handled depends on t h e  c u l t u r a l  
background of t h e  p a r t i e s  involved: some 
p l a y e r s  might b e  tempted t o  d e f e c t  from a 
Pare to  s o l u t i o n  f o r  one-sided ga ins .  Thus, 
most s p e c i f i c  agreements r e q u i r e  s p e c i a l  
p rov i s ions  t o  en fo rce  them--such a s  
s p e c i f y i n g  p e n a l t i e s  f o r  "cheating" t h a t  
a c t u a l l y  change t h e  o r i g i n a l  game i n t o  a  
new one i n  which t h e  agreed solut ionbecomes 
a  unique Nash equi l ibr ium.  
A FRAMEWORK FOR A DECISION 
AND MEDIATION SUPPORT SYSTEM 
FOR INTERACTIVE GAMING 
A l l  of t h e  above a n a l y s i s  s h o w  t h a t  i t  is 
p o s s i b l e  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a  d e c i s i o n  and 
mediat ion suppor t  system f o r  i n t e r a c t i v e  
gaming experiments. The purpose of such 
s y s t e m  i s ,  f i r s t ,  educa t iona l :  t o  provide  
p l a y e r s  wi th  a  v e h i c l e  f o r  l e a r n i n g  about 
c o n f l i c t  and cooperat ion i n  s t r u c t u r e d  way, 
us ing games based on t h e i r  own f i e l d  of 
i n t e r e s t .  However, t h e s e  systems could 
a l s o  be  used f o r  r e s e a r c h  purposes (e .  g., 
t o  analyze  s p e c i f i c  examples of c o n f l i c t  
and cooperat ion) ;  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  they may 
even be  used i n  r e a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
Since  many gaming experiments begin  w i t h  
i n t e r a c t i v e  model bu i ld ing  ( s e e ,  e .g . ,  
Hol l ing,  1978), which a l s o  invo lves  
s imula t ion  gaming, we could say t h a t  t h e  
i n i t i a l  mode of such a d e c i s i o n  and media- 
t i o n  suppor t  system is  simulation gming 
( t h i s  inc ludes  i n t e r a c t i v e  model b u i l d i n g  
and j o i n t  v a l i d a t i o n  wi th  model u s e r s ) .  
Even i n  t h i s  phase, t h e  suppor t ing  team of 
a n a l y s t s  might inc lude  a  f a c i l i t a t o r  o r  
ch ie f  a n a l y s t  who w i l l  he lp  i n  mediation i n  
l a t e r  phases.  It should be  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  
t h e  model and d e c i s i o n  suppor t  system a l -  
ways play a  s e r v i c e  r o l e  i n  such exper i -  
ments; human i n t e r a c t i o n  is t h e  most i m -  
por tan t  element. Therefore ,  whenever w e  
speak about mediation suppor t  h e r e ,  i t  
should not n e c e s s a r i l y  be assumed t h a t  t h i s  
suppor t  i s  extended by t h e  computer system 
d i r e c t l y  t o  p laye r s ;  t h e  f a c i l i t a t o r  may 
j u s t  use  t h e  sugges t ions  made by t h e  com- 
p u t e r  system i n  d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h  t h e p l a y e r s .  
The second mode of t h e  system i s  game 
analysis. The behavior  of p laye r s  when 
they approach a  gaming experiment f o r  t h e  
f i r s t  time is  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from t h e i r  
behavior when they have a l ready  played t h e  
All possibk 
Fig.  7. Mediated s e l e c t i o n  of game e q u i l i b r i a :  SC r e p r e s e n t s  a u n i l a t e r a i  c o n s t r u c t i v e  1 
move f o r  p l a y e r  1; SC2 r e p r e s e n t s  a u n i l a t e r a l  c o n s t r u c t i v e  move f o r  p l a y e r  2;  
- 
0 r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  j o i n t  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  outcome; s(q-G)= min (qi-Gi)/(ii-ii) ; 0 i = i , 2  
0 r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  outcome corresponding t o  t h e  mediated game equ i l ib r ium.  
m 
Fig. 8. M u l t i l a t e r a l  coopera t ive  improvements: 4 r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  s t a t u s  quo outcome; 
1 2 3 4  Aq ,Aq r e p r e s e n t  t h e  maximum coopera t ive  i n c r e a s e s ;  q ,q , q  ,q .. r e p r e s e n t  1 2  
the  outcomes of success ive  d e c i s i o n s  proposed by t h e  media tor .  
game a  few times and analyzed i t .  I n  
o rde r  t o  s t i m u l a t e  game a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  suppor t  system can provide  t h e  
p laye r  wi th  v a r i o u s  p ieces  of informa- 
t i o n  about t h e  game, such a s  t h e  game 
images t h a t  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  paper.  A f t e r  
a  d i scuss ion  of t h e  b a s i c  p r o p e r t i e s  of 
t h e  game, t h e  s imula t ion  gaming experiment 
can be  repeated,  and t h e  behavior  of t h e  
p laye r  monitored. 
The t h i r d  mode of t h e  system is  unilateral 
decision-supported gaming. I f  t h e  system 
is equipped wi th  programs f o r  computing 
u n i l a t e r a l  s a t i s f i c i n g  e q u i l i b r i a ,  a p l a y e r  
can reques t  s e v e r a l  computer-assis t ed  
ana lyses  b e f o r e  making h i s  move. A f t e r  
spec i fy ing  h i s  own a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  and 
es t ima t ing  those  of t h e  o t h e r s ,  he  can 
reques t  t h e  suppor t  system t o  compute h i s  
own s a t i s f i c i n g  ( c o n s t r u c t i v e  o r  des t ruc-  
t i v e )  op t ions ,  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  moves of t h e  
o t h e r  p laye r s ,  t h e  e s t ima ted  j o i n t  out- 
comes, e t c . ,  and only  then dec ide  upon h i s  
move. 
The f o u r t h  mode of t h e  system fs unilateral 
decision and mediation supported gaming. 
This mode assumes an a c t i v e  mediator ,  who' 
could b e  t h e  f a c i l i t a t o r  and o rgan ize r  of 
t h e  game al though a t  t h i s  s t a g e  he  cannot 
propose j o i n t  a c t i o n s  bu t  only  suggest  
modif ica t ions  of u n i l a t e r a l  a c t i o n s .  He 
can do t h i s  because t h e  a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  
of a l l  p l aye r s ,  a l though no t  known t o  each 
o the r ,  a r e  known t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  suppor t  
system and t h e  mediator.  The mediator can 
thus  u s e  t h e  system t o  compute mediated 
game e q u i l i b r i a  and sugges t  r easonab le  ad- 
justments of t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n s  t o  t h e  
p laye r s .  
The f i f t h  and f i n a l  mode of t h e  system is 
mediation support for multiZateral agree- 
ments. I n  t h i s  mode t h e  mediator  suggests  
coopera t ive  a c t i o n s  t o  t h e  p l a y e r s ,  t h e s e  
sugges t ions  a r e  a s sessed  by t h e  p l a y e r s ,  
and t h e i r  responses a r e  then used by t h e  
mediator and t h e  suppor t  system t o g e n e r a t e  
new proposals .  
C lea r ly ,  no t  a l l  of t h e s e  modes w i l l  be 
necessary  i n  every a p p l i c a t i o n :  f o r  
example, p laye r s  might dec ide  t o  go 
d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  f i f t h m o d e a f t e r  completing 
t h e  f i r s t  and second phases.  
CONCLUSIONS 
We conclude t h a t  i t  i s  i n  p r i n c i p l e  pos- 
s i b l e  t o  b u i l d  dec i s ion  and mediat ion 
suppor t  systems f o r  use  i n  i n t e r a c t i v e  
gaming; w e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  such systems could 
c o n t r i b u t e  considerably  t o  our  under- 
s t and ing  of c o n f l i c t  processes .  Such sup- 
p o r t  systems a r e  c u r r e n t l y  being developed 
a t  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  fo rAppl ied  
Systems Analysis t o  analyze  (among o t h e r  
th ings )  f i s h e r y  c o n f l i c t s ,  North-South 
economic r e l a t i o n s  and n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  
f o r  long-term energy planning. 
There i s  a l s o  an important  methodological  
conclusion: e x p l i c i t  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  
changes t h a t  t a k e  p l a c e i n  a s p i r a t i o n  
l e v e l s  a s  c o n f l i c t s  develop might t a k e  us  
a  long way toward unders tanding c o n f l i c t  
processes .  The examples given i n  t h i s  
paper i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i n f l a t e d  a s p i r a t i o n s  
l ead  t o  c o n f l i c t  e s c a l a t i o n ,  whi l e  a  down- 
ward r e v i s i o n  of a s p i r a t i o n  l e v e l s  l e a d s  
t o  c o n f l i c t  de-escala t ion;  t h i s  p roper ty  
seeme t o  be  q u i t e  genera l ,  bu t  r e q u i r e s  
f u r t h e r  s tudy.  
The second p a r t  of t h i s  paper w i l l  address  
i n  more d e t a i l  t h e  mathematical  a s p e c t s  of 
t h e  concepts  d i scussed  he re .  
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